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1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2000).
2. See id. § 16.
3. McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005).
The FAA is codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
4. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); see also Comm. on Commerce, Trade &
Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153,
155-56 (1925); Todd Baker, Comment, Arbitration in the 21st Century: Where We’ve Been,
Where We’re Going, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 653, 658 (2000).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
597
COMMENT
Interlocutory Appeals Under the Federal Arbitration Act
and the Effect on the District Court’s Proceedings
I. Introduction
Buried in the pages of many modern contracts are agreements to arbitrate
any existing or future disputes that may arise.  These arbitration provisions
may appear innocuous, but when a subsequent dispute develops between the
contracting parties and one party fails to comply with the arbitration
provisions, turmoil ensues.  The party wishing to arbitrate must request that
the court enforce the contract and mandate that the parties resolve the dispute
through arbitration.  Before issuing that mandate, the court must determine
the validity of the arbitration provision in question and whether the arbitration
provision even covers the dispute involved.1  This process culminates with the
court issuing a ruling on whether to compel arbitration.  If the court denies the
motion to compel arbitration and instructs the parties to proceed to litigation,
the party wishing to arbitrate has an immediate opportunity to appeal.2
Whether the lower court’s proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome
of the appeal or whether the lower court should proceed consistent with its
ruling that the dispute is not arbitrable is unclear.  Currently, the circuits are
split on the proper outcome under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which
governs arbitration issues in the Federal Courts.3
The United States Congress intended the FAA to place arbitration
agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts” and to reverse a
general distrust of arbitration by the judiciary while promoting an efficient
business practice.4  Section 2 of the FAA codifies this intent by stating that
“a written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”5  
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6. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec.
1019, § 15, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670-71 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 22 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5983.
8. Id. at 23, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5983.
9. McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005).
10. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004); Britton v. Co-op Banking
Group, 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990).
11. McCauley, 413 F.3d 1158; Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 366 F.3d 1249 (11th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128
F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997).
12. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (“[A]ny
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion . . . .”); STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.4, at 23 (2001); id.
§ 2.28, at 63-64.
To further the purpose of making arbitration agreements enforceable,
Congress amended the FAA in 1988 to allow for an interlocutory appeal of
decisions denying a motion to compel arbitration and decisions refusing to
stay proceedings pending arbitration.6  The drafters of the 1988 amendment
sought to cure the “overload” of cases in the federal courts and the inadequate
opportunity for parties to seek justice through the courts.7  Moreover, the
drafters of the amendment sought to encourage the enforcement and
utilization of alternative “dispute resolution, such as arbitration.”8
The FAA, however, does not address whether an interlocutory appeal
under § 16 stays the district court’s proceedings pending the appeal.9  The
Second and Ninth Circuits have held that arbitrability is separate from the
merits of the case, and thus, an appeal from a denial of a motion to compel
arbitration does not necessarily stay the district court’s proceedings.10
Conversely, the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
arbitrability is so interrelated to the merits of the case that the district court’s
proceedings should be stayed unless the appeal is frivolous.11  Neither
approach, however, has adequately introduced a workable solution.  This
comment argues that, based on the Supreme Court’s willingness to construe
arbitration agreements broadly to encompass many types of disputes and the
goal of the FAA to make arbitration an effective remedy to a contract
breach,12 district courts should stay proceedings pending the appeal of the
district court’s ruling about whether the dispute is subject to the arbitration
agreement, except where a party is predominately using arbitration as a means
to stall proceedings and deny another access to justice.  Additionally, before
a court determines that a case falls within this exception, the court must take
an affirmative step, such as conducting a hearing to ascertain whether
arbitration is being used  improperly.
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13. See Baker, supra note 4, at 653.
14. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.1, at 19.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 2.2, at 19.
18. For a discussion regarding the validity of binding noncontractual arbitration, see id.
§ 2.55, at 113-17.
19. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (addressing the “[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate” (emphasis added)).
20. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.2, at 19.
21. Id. § 2.3, at 21.
22. Section 5 of the FAA states that if the agreement contains “a method of naming or
Part II of this comment provides a brief overview of arbitration and its
history in the United States, culminating in the FAA’s adoption.  Part II also
discusses the development of the FAA and the U.S. judiciary’s shift toward
favoring arbitration as a remedy in most types of cases.  Part III addresses the
current split in the U.S. courts of appeals and analyzes the respective circuits’
rationales for favoring one alternative over another.  Part IV of this comment
analyzes the circuits’ approaches in the context of the original policy
objectives behind the passage of the FAA and the current judiciary’s policy
of favoring arbitration and suggests an alternative standard to rectify the
current circuit split.
II. Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act
A. A Brief Overview of Arbitration
Arbitration is a private adjudication of disputes between opposing parties.13
Arbitration is private in two respects.14  First, arbitration is nongovernmental
as it arises from a contract between the parties and presided over by a
nonjudicial arbitrator.15  Second, and arguably more importantly, the
arbitration proceedings are usually secret and confidential per the terms of the
parties’ contract.16
Arbitration can arise in either a contractual or noncontractual setting.17
Noncontractual arbitration is rarely binding, if at all, because of an
individual’s Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.18  The application of
noncontractual arbitration is beyond the scope of this comment because the
FAA only addresses contractual arbitration.19
Contractual arbitration can be binding because courts allow a party to
waive his or her right to a jury trial.20  In contractual arbitration, the
arbitration agreement specifies the applicable law and procedural rules that
will be applied during arbitration.21  The arbitration agreement may also
provide that the parties will select an arbitrator to oversee the proceedings.22
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appointing an arbitrator . . . such method shall be followed.”  9 U.S.C. § 5.  However, “if no
method [is] provided” or if the method is ineffective, “then upon the application of either
party . . . the court shall . . . appoint an arbitrator.”  Id.  The court appointed arbitrator “shall
act . . . with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named” in the
agreement.  Id.; see also WARE, supra note 12, § 2.36, at 76.
23. 9 U.S.C. § 5; see also WARE, supra note 12, § 2.36, at 76.
24. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.1, at 19.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 2.3, at 21.
27. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
28. Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous
Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 793
(2002).
29. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (2d ed. 1985) (stating that
disputes were mediated in Massachusetts as early as 1636).
30. Id. at 45, 95.
31. Id.
32. Id.
In the absence of such a provision, the court, pursuant to authority granted by
the FAA, will select an arbitrator to oversee the proceedings.23  The arbitrator
adjudicates the dispute just as a judge or jury adjudicate in a trial.24  Finally,
the arbitration agreement will generally provide that neither party may discuss
the arbitration proceedings or the matters discussed during the proceedings.25
Once the arbitrator renders his award, the courts enforce the award, but
have limited ability to review or modify it.26  The courts can review or modify
the award only “[w]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means”; where the arbitrators were not independent; where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers or acted in a way to prejudice the
proceedings; or where the award does not adequately resolve the dispute in
question.27 
B. Development of Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act
Merchants have used arbitration as far back as the medieval period to
resolve disputes,28 and forms of arbitration have existed in the United States
since the colonial period.29  The early American attempts at arbitration were
motivated by a general distaste of formal, adversarial litigation.30  These
attempts sought the formation of a dispute resolution process that offered
“harmony and peace” while still producing binding judgments.31  Moreover,
early arbitration was an effort to provide everyday citizens a means to access
justice that was simple and did not include lawyers or their “esoteric
language.”32  Even so, not until 1920 did an American state codify an
arbitration act that made agreements to arbitrate existing and future disputes
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss3/3
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33. Pittman, supra note 28, at 797, 799.  The state was New York.  Id.  See generally Civil
Practice Act, ch. 925, §§ 1410-1431, [1920] 4 N.Y. Laws 473 (codified as amended at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2007)).
34. Baker, supra note 4, at 653.
35. Id. at 655.
36. See Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 102 F. 926, 928 (2d Cir. 1900) (holding that
the appellant was only entitled to nominal damages); see also WARE, supra note 12, § 2.4, at
23 n.32 (discussing the result in Munson).
37. Baker, supra note 4, at 655.
38. Munson, 102 F. at 926.






45. Id. at 928.
46. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.4, at 23. 
binding and enforceable in state courts.33  Following suit, Congress enacted
the FAA in 1925, making arbitration provisions binding and enforceable in
federal courts.34  
Prior to the FAA’s passage, many courts either would not enforce
arbitration provisions,35 or would only award nominal damages for the breach
of an agreement to arbitrate.36  The courts’ hostility arose from what they saw
as an encroachment on the judiciary.37  Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co.
evidences the judiciary’s hostility.38  In Munson, the parties agreed to submit
all disputes that may have arisen from the transaction to a panel of three
arbitrators,39 and the arbitrators’ decision was intended to be final.40  A
dispute arose, but one of the parties refused to arbitrate and filed suit in
admiralty.41  After the trial concluded, the party that had wished to arbitrate
petitioned the court for damages based on the failure of the other party to
arbitrate.42  In denying the petition, the Second Circuit noted that even though
covenants to arbitrate future disputes were common, no cases existed that
awarded damages solely on the fact that one of the parties refused to
arbitrate.43  The Second Circuit reasoned that the lack of cases awarding
damages for a refusal to arbitrate was understandable because of the
“impossibility of proving substantial damages.”44  The Second Circuit
ultimately held that the party wishing to arbitrate could not prove anything
more than nominal damages even though the cost of arbitration would have
been “much less.”45
In contrast to the lack of redress available in early courts, the FAA’s pro-
contract position requires courts to order specific performance as the remedy
for a breach of an arbitration agreement.46  The FAA’s stated purpose “was
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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47. Baker, supra note 4, at 653.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (“The [Federal Arbitration] Act was
designed ‘to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.’”
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985))); WARE, supra note
12, § 2.4, at 22.
49. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (“[C]ourts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed
to be overturned without legislative enactment . . . .”).
50. Baker, supra note 4, at 658; see also Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law,
supra note 4, at 155.
51. Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, supra note 4, at 155; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 68-96, at 2; Baker, supra note 4, at 658. 
52. Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, supra note 4, at 155; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 68-96, at 2; Baker, supra note 4, at 658.
53. Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, supra note 4, at 156; Baker, supra
note 4, at 658.
54. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.3, at 21; Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law,
supra note 4, at 156.
55. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(stating that, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party merely “trades the procedures and opportunity for
review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration”).
56. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1.
to create a procedural rule favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements
in federal courts” and thus reverse a history of judicial hostility toward
arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements.47 The FAA placed
arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts.”48  To this
end, the FAA encouraged the judiciary to properly enforce all contracts
equally, including those contracts containing agreements to arbitrate existing
and future disputes.49
In addition to reversing judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements, the
drafters of the FAA also sought to encourage what they saw as an efficient
business practice that cured many “evils.”50  First, the drafters saw arbitration
as a way to eliminate the delay associated with litigation because some
disputes can take several years of litigation before being fully adjudicated.51
Second, the drafters saw arbitration as less expensive alternative to
litigation.52  Finally, the drafters viewed arbitration as more efficient because
of its nontraditional remedies.53  The FAA accomplishes these objectives by
enforcing arbitration agreements that place limits on discovery, evidentiary
standards, and other procedural rules and by allowing an arbitrator significant
freedom in crafting arbitration awards.54  Moreover, all of the drafters’ beliefs
about arbitration continue to find judicial support today.55
Simply, the FAA “make[s] [a] contracting party live up to his
agreement.”56  Otherwise, the breaching party could decide never to arbitrate
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss3/3
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57. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
58. Id. § 3.
59. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec.
1019, § 15(a)(1)(A)-(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670-71 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§ 16(a)(1)(A)-(B)).  Section 1019 was originally codified at 9 U.S.C. § 15, see 9 U.S.C. § 15
(1988), and was renumbered as § 16 by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 325(a)(1), 104 Stat. 5089, 5120.
60. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (“[T]he party willing to perform his contract for arbitration
is not subject to the delay and cost of litigation.”).
61. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
while the other party is left with little judicial recourse.  Sections 3 and 4 of
the FAA codify the mandate of specific performance for a breach of an
arbitration provision. Section 4 states,
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition any United States district court which . . . would have
jurisdiction under title 28 . . . for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement. . . . [T]he court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.57
Section 3 fulfills the mandate of specific performance by stating,
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with
the terms of the agreement . . . .58
Moreover, to make this mandate of specific performance an effective
remedy, Congress subsequently amended the FAA to make the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration or a motion to stay proceedings pending
arbitration immediately appealable under § 16 of the FAA.59  Without this
provision, the party moving to compel arbitration would have to litigate the
entire dispute before seeking review of the district court’s decision not to
compel arbitration.  This result would effectively deny that party the benefit
of the bargain.60  As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “[s]uch a course
could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate.”61  
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62. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b) (providing that interlocutory appeals from decisions favoring
arbitration are only allowed if permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).  See generally Edith H.
Jones, Appeals of Arbitration Orders-Coming Out of the Serbonian Bog, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 361
(1990) (providing an overview of the appeals process).
63. Jones, supra note 62, at 375-76.
64. Id.  But see Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 01-545, 2002 WL 1835642,
at *1-2 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2002) (allowing discovery for litigation because it was commenced
before the appeal and would benefit the parties regardless of the forum in which the dispute was
ultimately resolved).
65. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985)
(first alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
66. 3 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 157:15, at 157-34 (3d
ed. 2006).
67. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.4, at 22.
68. Pittman, supra note 28, at 881 (“[T]he Court . . . continued its own policy of favoring
arbitration over court adjudication.” (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79, 89-90 (2000))).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
Congress left unchanged, however, a litigant’s ability to appeal a district
court’s decision in favor of arbitration, but this is understandable based on the
previous judicial decisions regarding arbitration.62  The drafters of § 16 did
not fear that the judiciary would erroneously enforce arbitration agreements.63
Additionally, proceeding with arbitration raises few practical concerns
because any discovery and preparation done for arbitration will benefit the
parties if the decision to compel arbitration is later overturned and the dispute
later litigated.64  This policy of erring on the side of arbitration is shown by
the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement that “‘[t]he preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which
parties had entered,’ a concern which ‘requires that we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate.’”65  Overall, the bifurcation of § 16 encourages
arbitration and “prevent[s] parties from frustrating arbitration through
lengthy, preliminary appeals.”66
Congress’s goals for the FAA have been largely realized. Since the FAA’s
adoption in 1925, it has become one of the most important U.S. sources of
arbitration law.67  In addition, the U.S. judiciary has almost completely
reversed its view on the enforcement of arbitration agreements.68
C. The U.S. Judiciary’s Current Stance on Arbitration Agreements
The FAA grants the courts power to determine whether a dispute is subject
to an arbitration agreement.69  Courts derive this power from the language of
§ 3, which states that “upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss3/3
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70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
72. Id. at 628.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 627.
77. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
78. Id. at 23 n.27.
79. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
476 (1989); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
80. WARE, supra note 12, § 2.27, at 61 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987)).
81. Baker, supra note 4, at 669.
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, [the court]
shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.”70  
The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a willingness to interpret arbitration
agreements broadly to encompass a wide array of disputes.  In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,71 the Court held that
determining whether a dispute is subject to arbitration involves a two-step
inquiry.72  First, a court must determine whether the arbitration agreement
covers the issue in dispute.73  If so, a court must then determine whether an
external legal constraint forecloses the arbitration of those claims.74
Addressing the first prong, the Court held that in determining whether the
arbitration agreement covers the dispute, “the parties’ intentions [should]
control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of
arbitrability.”75  The Court further stated that the FAA manifests a
congressional policy requiring courts to liberally construe agreements to
arbitrate.76  The Court reached a similar conclusion two years earlier in Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.77  In Moses, the
Court stated that the policies underlying the adoption of the FAA require a
liberal reading of arbitration agreements,78 and courts should resolve
ambiguous issues in favor of enforcing arbitration.79
As for the second part of the inquiry — whether external legal constraints
foreclose arbitration — the Supreme Court has held, since the 1980s, that
almost any type of claim is arbitrable, and the party opposing arbitration must
show a clear congressional intent to exclude a claim from arbitration before
the courts will deny a motion to compel arbitration.80  In fact, the Supreme
Court has expanded the FAA’s application to contracts specifically excluded
by § 1 of the FAA.81  The Court has accomplished this expansion through two
main avenues.  First, the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
“evidencing a transaction involving commerce” found in § 2 of the FAA to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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82. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995) (emphasis
omitted); see also Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach
to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 71 (2005) (“Allied-
Bruce tied the scope of the FAA to the outer limits of the Commerce Clause, rather than to the
vagaries of contractual intent.”).
83. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
84. McGuinness & Karr, supra note 82, at 72 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001)).
85. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1998).
86. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id.
89. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 23-24.
92. Id. at 24.
encompass anything “affecting commerce,” thus stretching the FAA’s
application to almost all transactions.82  Second, the Supreme Court has
narrowly interpreted the FAA’s clause exempting “contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce” from arbitration,83 limiting this exemption to
cover only “employment contracts of transportation workers.”84  One notable
exception to this doctrine of expansion, however, is the Ninth Circuit’s
refusal to apply this broad brush by holding that claims involving
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
are not subject to arbitration.85
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.86 provides an example of the
courts’ expansion of arbitrable claims.  The defendant in Gilmer hired the
plaintiff as a financial services manager.87  As a condition of employment, the
plaintiff registered with the New York Stock Exchange,88 and the registration
agreement contained a provision stating that the plaintiff “agree[d] to arbitrate
any dispute, claim or controversy arising between him and [the defendant].”89
Subsequently, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment.90  In
response, the plaintiff filed a claim of age discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and brought suit alleging a violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).91  The defendant
moved to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim,92 but the district court
denied the defendant’s motion based on the belief that Congress intended to





95. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1985)).
96. Id. at 25 n.2 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
97. Id. at 25.
98. Id. at 26.
99. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 29 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
483 (1989)).
103. Id. at 30.
settled in a judicial forum.93  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, however, reversed the trial court’s decision to deny arbitration.94
On certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reiterated the FAA’s
original purpose of “revers[ing] the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements that had existed . . . by American courts, and [of]
plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”95
The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s claim was
not subject to arbitration because § 1 of the FAA specifically exempts
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from being subject to
arbitration by narrowly construing the term “contracts of employment” to
exclude the registration agreement.96  
The Court then affirmed its previous holdings that the FAA manifests a
policy favoring arbitration agreements.97  In addition, the Court stated that it
is well settled that statutory claims may be submitted to arbitration.98  In the
Court’s view, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; [the party] only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”99  The Court
noted that even though “all statutory claims may not be appropriate for
arbitration,” the courts should hold parties to their arbitration agreements
unless Congress has granted a specific exception.100  Moreover, the party
disputing arbitration bears the burden of showing that Congress has provided
such an exception.101 
Furthermore, the Court validated arbitration and its importance in dispute
resolution, recognizing arbitration provisions as a valid means of selecting a
forum for dispute resolution.102  First, knowledgeable arbitrators, like judges,
are presumed to be independent conduct arbitrations.103  Additionally, if an
arbitrator’s independence is questioned, the courts have the ability to overturn
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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104. See supra text accompanying note 27.
105. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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the arbitrator’s decision.104  Second, although the discovery allowed in
arbitration is more limited than that permitted for a trial, this is a conscious
choice by the parties, who choose the speed and simplicity of arbitration over
litigation’s more expansive discovery.105  Third, the lack of an extensive
opinion by the arbitrator is not fatal to the validity of arbitration as a valid
alternative to litigation.106  Finally, arbitration’s nontraditional remedies
provide another incentive for parties to choose arbitration over litigation.107
Even though decisions such as Gilmer further the FAA’s aims of
encouraging arbitration, they ultimately reach conclusions at odds with the
original intent of the drafters of the FAA, who never intended for the FAA to
give preference to agreements to arbitrate.108  Rather the drafters intended to
create an adequate alternative to litigation.109  In fact, at least one scholar has
noted that the American Bar Association committee that drafted the precursor
to the FAA only intended it to apply to “arbitration agreements between
merchants who have equal bargaining power and . . . only [to] commercial
contracts and disputes.”110  Justice John Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged such a position in his dissent in Gilmer, stating, “I doubt
that any legislator who voted for [the FAA] expected it . . . to form contracts
between parties of unequal bargaining power . . . .”111  Moreover, the drafters
may have only intended the FAA to cover ordinary and simple disputes
believing that major issues involving constitutional questions and policy
should be resolved by the judiciary.112
Nevertheless, under the judiciary’s current interpretation of the FAA,
courts place arbitration agreements on “better footing than other contracts.”113
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the FAA “confers only
the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in [the parties’] agreement,’”114 federal courts have implemented
an agenda favoring arbitration by interpreting arbitration provisions
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broadly.115  This agenda reveals itself in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
instructions to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”116  One scholar
has posited that the judicial policy of favoring arbitration is, in actuality, a
means “to further the Court’s own self-interested goal of reducing the number
of cases pending in the federal courts.”117  While in the courts’ interest,
favoring arbitration may also be sound policy because the parties can apply
many prearbitration expenses to subsequent litigation but cannot recover the
cost and delays associated with litigation.  There remains a risk, however, that
a reviewing court will not overturn or review either the decision compelling
arbitration or the final arbitration award.118  
When evaluating this risk, the parties must remember that courts rarely
overturn arbitration awards.119  Three main reasons explain the rarity.  First,
courts view arbitration as a low-cost, fast alternative to litigation, and
frequently vacated arbitration awards would reduce arbitration to a costly
preliminary step in litigation.120  Second, and more importantly, courts view
vacating the award as contrary to the parties’ bargain.121  Third, the FAA
allows the reviewing court to overturn or modify an award only under limited
circumstances.122  These limited circumstances are justified because allowing
the courts to frequently vacate arbitration awards would, in essence, allow the
court not to enforce the contract between the parties, which is one of the
problems the FAA sought to cure.123
Based on the current judicial policy favoring arbitration, the forum
selection possibilities, and the increase in electronic commerce, arbitration
agreements will likely continue to grow in importance and use as will
disputes over the scope and applicability of such agreements.124  With this
growth, parties will seek more certainty in how disputes will be resolved.
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Thus, the current judicial split could significantly alter how some businesses
are conducted.
III. Circuit Court Split on Whether an Appeal Under § 16 Divests the
District Court of Jurisdiction
Before the passage of § 16 of the FAA, the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine
governed the appealability of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion to stay legal proceedings pending arbitration.125  Under this doctrine,
“a stay of legal proceedings on equitable grounds was analogous to an
injunction,” and injunctions are immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1).126  “[B]ecause arbitration was an equitable defense,” decisions
about whether to stay the district court’s proceedings “pending arbitration was
appealable as an injunction.”127  The U.S. Supreme Court eventually overruled
the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp.128
Congress enacted § 16 of the FAA to fill the void left by the overruled
Enelow-Ettelson doctrine,129 and § 16 continues to govern the appealability of
decisions regarding arbitration.  As previously discussed, § 16 allows for the
immediate appeal of antiarbitration decisions, while orders compelling
arbitration are only appealable in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
1292.130  The FAA is silent, however, on whether the court in question should
grant a motion to stay proceedings pending the immediate appeal of an
antiarbitration decision,131 and the circuit courts are split on whether such an
appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction, thus requiring a stay of the
district court proceedings.132  Currently, the Second and Ninth Circuits hold
that the district court is not divested of jurisdiction, and thus, a stay is not
required.133  Conversely, the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit hold that the
district court is divested of jurisdiction unless the appeal is frivolous.134
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A. Circuit Court Cases Holding that the District Court Is Not Divested of
Jurisdiction
In Britton v. Co-op Banking Group,135 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit became one of the first appellate courts to address whether an
interlocutory appeal under § 16 of the FAA divests the district court of
jurisdiction.136  This opinion has become the foremost opinion asserting that
a § 16 interlocutory appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction, as
evidenced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit express
adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in reaching the same result.137
1. Britton v. Co-op Banking Group
In Britton, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had engaged in securities
fraud by selling a fraudulent tax shelter investment and filed a claim in the
district court.138  The defendant’s sole response was to assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.139  When the plaintiffs
refused to settle, the defendant demanded arbitration of the dispute based on
an arbitration provision contained in the original contract of sale.140  The
defendant made this demand more than a year after the filing of the original
complaint.141  Accordingly, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to § 4 of the FAA.142  The district court denied the motion to compel
arbitration, and the defendant appealed the district court’s decision.143  On
interlocutory appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit denied a motion to stay the
district court proceedings pending the appeal of the denial of the motion to
compel arbitration, and the district court entered a default judgment against the
defendant for failure to comply with the district court proceedings.144
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a district court’s
judgment on the merits did not preclude the circuit court from hearing the
appeal of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration because the circuit
court could vacate the district court’s decision upon determining that the
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district court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration.145  Without
the power to vacate the district court’s judgment “the statutory right to appeal
would be nugatory.”146  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the fear of
contempt sanctions and the possibility of the circuit court sustaining the
judgment of the district court would induce the parties to comply with a
district court’s orders and judgments.147  The court equated this scenario to the
risk assessment undertaken by a defendant who challenges personal
jurisdiction by refusing to appear.148  If a defendant refuses to appear, the
defendant becomes subject to a default judgment.149  To enforce this judgment,
the plaintiff must bring the default judgement to a forum with personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.150  If the new forum rules that the original
court had personal jurisdiction, the defendant is subject to the judgment with
no opportunity to contest the case on the merits.151
Once the court determined that the appeal was not moot, the court addressed
the issue of whether the appeal pursuant to § 16 of the FAA divested the
district court of jurisdiction over the case.152  Acknowledging the general rule
that a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction and vests
jurisdiction in the appellate court, the Ninth Circuit determined that appeals
from a denial to compel arbitration were an exception to this general rule.153
The Ninth Circuit ruled that arbitrability was separate from the merits of the
case and that the district court, by not staying its proceedings, was “simply
moving the case along consistent with its view of the case as reflected in its
order denying arbitration.”154  In other words, the appeal did not divest the
district court of jurisdiction because “an appeal of an interlocutory order does
not ordinarily deprive the district court of jurisdiction except with regard to
matters that are the subject of the appeal,” and the only substantive issue raised
by a § 16 appeal is that of arbitrability.155
The court feared that a contrary ruling — requiring a mandatory stay —
would allow a defendant to stall the trial court’s proceedings by bringing a
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provided adequate protection for the party seeking arbitration by granting the
district court the authority to evaluate whether the circumstances warranted a
stay.157  
Even though the Ninth Circuit evaluated the appeal in light of the FAA, the
FAA does not fully support the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.  The court relied on
the language of § 3 that states, “upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement,
[the court] shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial.”158  The
Ninth Circuit, however, misapplied § 3 of the FAA.  Section 3 applies only
when the district court determines that the issue “is referable to arbitration”
and grants the motion to compel arbitration under § 4.159  Thus, § 3 did not
apply in Britton because the district court had not compelled arbitration under
§ 4.  
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to address two issues in its opinion.
First, the court did not answer why a district court would stay its proceedings
pending an appeal that the court believes is without merit.  Second, the court
failed to address the section of the FAA that did apply, § 16.  As previously
noted, § 16 is silent on whether the district court should grant a stay during an
appeal of a denial to compel arbitration.160  In addition, the Ninth Circuit
blindly relied on two cases in which courts used their discretion to grant stays
in the proceedings: Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.161 and C.B.S. Employees
Federal Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.162
In Pearce, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed
two main issues: whether the claim brought by the plaintiff was subject to the
arbitration agreement and whether the court should stay the district court
proceedings pending arbitration.163  The Hutton Group “pled guilty to 2,000
counts of mail and wire fraud in connection with its cash management
practices.”164  In the aftermath of these guilty pleas, the Hutton Group
employed an independent investigator to determine who, internally, was
responsible for the fraud.165  A subsequent press release named the plaintiff as
one of a select few individuals responsible for the fraud,166 and the plaintiff
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sued the Hutton Group and the independent investigator claiming that the press
release defamed him.167  The Hutton Group moved to stay all proceedings and
to subject all claims to arbitration in accordance with the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange, with which the plaintiff had to register as a condition
of employment with the Hutton Group.168
The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the
dispute fell outside of the arbitration agreement.169  Moreover, the district court
found that the claim against the independent investigator was not subject to
arbitration as the investigator was not bound by the arbitration provisions
found in the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.170  Therefore, if the court
compelled arbitration of the claims against the Hutton Group, the court would
have to stay the proceedings against the independent investigator pending the
arbitration.171  The district court reasoned that this bifurcation would afford the
independent investigator “an unfair advantage in the eventual trial before the
court between [the independent investigator] and [the] plaintiff.”172  The
district court, however, did stay the proceeding against the Hutton Group
pending an appeal of the arbitrability of the claim against it.173  The district
court noted that the “Hutton Group would suffer substantial harm if [the
plaintiff’s] action were not stayed pending appeal and the District Court was
later reversed.”174
Upon appeal by the Hutton Group, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that a
strong federal policy encouraged interpreting disputes in such a way as to fall
within arbitration agreements.175  When the arbitration is specifically tailored
for such a dispute and the arbitration will be conducted by experts in the field,
the policy in favor of arbitration is at its strongest.176  The court also noted that
once a court determines that a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court must
stay the district court proceedings in accordance with § 3 of the FAA.177  With
these principles in mind, the circuit court held that the claim against the Hutton
Group was subject to arbitration, and § 3 of the FAA mandated that the circuit
court stay the district court’s proceedings.178
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The circuit court also noted that the claim against the independent
investigator could proceed even though the claim against the Hutton Group
was subject to arbitration.179  The court stated that it was “immaterial that
arbitration of that action will likely involve an examination of [the independent
investigator’s] conduct.”180  In addition, the court stated that it was immaterial
to its decision whether the litigation against the independent investigator ended
before or after the arbitration against the Hutton Group.181  The circuit court,
however, did not address whether the district court’s actual grant and denial
of stays was appropriate for the claims against the Hutton Group and the
independent investigator, respectively.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize key differences between Pearce
and Britton.  First, the district court in Pearce granted a stay pending the
appeal of claims that the district court thought may be subject to arbitration.182
The D.C. Circuit’s failure to address whether granting a stay was appropriate
can be seen as an implicit ruling that the action was appropriate.  The D.C.
Circuit’s acknowledgment that the claims against the independent investigator
should proceed regardless of the pending arbitration against the Hutton Group
strengthens this position.  Thus, the holding of Pearce, at least implicitly,
opposes the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate holding in Britton that the district court
should not stay its proceedings pending appeal.  The Ninth Circuit determined
that Pearce was an example of a district court exercising discretion in
choosing whether to grant a stay.183  The district court in Pearce, however, was
more likely exercising its discretion in determining whether the claim could
potentially be subject to arbitration when analyzed under the judiciary’s policy
of interpreting arbitration agreements broadly.  Furthermore, if the claim could
be subject to arbitration, a stay must be granted following § 3 of the FAA in
order to prevent the litigant from incurring substantial harm.  Therefore, the
D.C. Circuit in Pearce did not address the level of discretion a court has in
determining whether the proceedings should be stayed, but this is the very
proposition for which the Ninth Circuit in Britton cites Pearce.
The Ninth Circuit also relied on C.B.S. Employees Federal Credit Union v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. in Britton.184  In C.B.S., the
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district court reasoned that even though § 16185 effectively answers the
question of whether orders denying stays pending arbitration are appealable,
“it does not address a party’s right to have the proceedings stayed pending
such appeal.”186  The district court applied the four-prong test developed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Braunskill187 to evaluate whether it should
grant a stay under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.188  The four-part test
analyzes: 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) [whether] public interest [favors a stay].189
The district court in C.B.S. determined that a showing that a “serious legal
question” existed triggered an analysis of the first prong.190  To satisfy this
element, the litigant need not show that success on appeal is likely because
such a showing would require the district court to admit “that it erred in not
granting [the litigant’s] original motion to stay the proceedings.”191  Instead,
the litigant need only show that a difference of opinion exists between the
court and the litigant over an important legal question.192  Furthermore, the
court stated that the second element was satisfied even though monetary
expenses are usually not considered irreparable harm because the point of the
appeal is to avoid the cost of litigation, and without the stay the appeal is
meaningless.193  This rationale is similar to one advanced by the drafters of the
FAA — “the party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is not subject
to the delay and cost of litigation.”194  The district court, in analyzing the third
prong, determined that a stay would not substantially injure the other parties
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because delay is not considered a substantial injury.195  Finally, the district
court found that the public policy favoring “efficient allocation of judicial
resources” fulfilled the fourth prong.196
Applying this analysis to the facts of Britton indicates that the Ninth Circuit
should have granted a stay.  First, the question of arbitrability was a significant
legal issue affecting the district courts authority to hear the case.  Second, the
benefit of the appeal would be lost if defendant paid the litigation expenses.
Third, no evidence existed that an increased delay was not the only injury
faced by the plaintiffs, and finally, granting the stay would conserve judicial
resources.  In fact, by not complying with the district court’s orders, the
defendant in Britton seemed to obtain the most efficient outcome by
conserving his resources and the resources of the court.
2. Weiner v. Gutfreund (In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative
Litigation) and Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan
Five years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision of Britton, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit first addressed whether the district court should
stay its proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal under § 16 of the FAA in
Weiner v. Gutfreund (In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative
Litigation)197 and affirmed its decision nine years later in Motorola Credit
Corp. v. Uzan.198 In re Salomon involved a shareholder derivative suit brought
by Salomon Brothers against several former employees.199  The employees
moved to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA based on an arbitration
provision in their employment contracts and moved to stay the “three-year old
derivative suit.”200  The arbitrator named in the agreement refused to arbitrate
the dispute, and the district judge ordered that the parties proceed to trial
because he found that the agreement to arbitrate had been fulfilled and that the
employees were only using arbitration to “put[] off the awful day” of trial.201
Furthermore, the district judge denied the employees’ motion to stay the trial
pending an appeal under § 16 of the FAA.202  The Second Circuit twice denied
a similar motion by the employees,203 concluding that it would “not disturb
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[the district judge]’s decision to proceed to trial.”204  The Second Circuit
clarified its rationale in In re Salomon with its decision in Motorola.
In Motorola, the court explicitly followed its precedent of In re Salomon
and adopted the Ninth Circuit’s position that the question of arbitrability is
separate from the merits of the dispute.205  The Second Circuit in Motorola
stated that the In re Salomon decision “plainly contemplated that a district
court has jurisdiction to proceed with a case despite the pendency of an appeal
from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration.”206  Potentially even
more relevant than the precedent of In re Salomon were the Second Circuit’s
factual findings in Motorola.  The court found that the appellants had
“swindled two large corporations out of well over $2 billion,”207 had falsely
accused the appellees of making threats to kill the appellants, and had brought
the appeal to compel arbitration and to stay the district court proceedings only
after the district court’s ultimate decision against them.208  Additionally, the
defendants not only sought to compel arbitration but to undo a completed
trial.209
The decision in Motorola simultaneously expanded and restricted a district
judge’s ability to proceed to trial pending an appeal of arbitrability.  The
decision expanded the district judge’s ability to proceed to trial by effectively
eliminating any inquiry into the frivolousness of the appeal, stating that even
though the “appeal was not frivolous, the District Court did have jurisdiction
to continue with the case.”210  The Second Circuit added a caveat, however,
that the district court is forced to stay its proceedings if ordered by the circuit
court.211  This language removes some of the discretion granted to district
judges in In re Salomon by demonstrating the circuit court’s willingness to
interfere with the lower court’s proceedings.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits have been the
two main advocates of the position that a court should not stay the district
court’s proceedings because arbitrability is separate from the merits of a case.
This opinion, however, is only one side of the issue.
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B. Circuit Court Cases Holding that the District Court Is Divested of
Jurisdiction
As noted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Britton has become the seminal
opinion supporting the contention that a § 16 interlocutory appeal does not
divest the district court of jurisdiction.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer
Network, Inc.212 provides an antithesis to the Britton opinion.  At least two
additional circuits — the Tenth Circuit in McCauley v. Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc.213 and the Eleventh Circuit in Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing,
L.L.C.214 — have used the Bradford-Scott Data Corp. opinion as part of their
rationale for staying the district court proceedings.215
1. Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.
In Bradford-Scott Data Corp.,216 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit issued the most influential opinion in favor of staying the district court
proceedings pending the appeal of a denial to compel arbitration.  Bradford-
Scott Data Corporation (Bradford-Scott) had entered into an arrangement to
sell computer software written by VERSYSS, Inc. (VERSYSS).217  Two
separate agreements made up the arrangement: the Vertical Value-Added
Reseller Agreement (VAR) and the Master License Agreement (MLA).218
Each agreement contained an arbitration clause, with the clause in the VAR
being substantially broader than that in the MLA.219  Physician Computer
Network (PCN) subsequently acquired VERSYSS.220  Bradford-Scott
commenced the litigation, asserting that VERSYSS breached the MLA
through the PCN acquisition and subsequent conduct.221  Specifically, PCN
offered a competing software package to the package Bradford-Scott licensed
from VERSYSS.222  VERSYSS and PCN moved, pursuant to § 4 of the FAA,
to compel arbitration.223  The district court found that Bradford-Scott was not
required to arbitrate the dispute because the arbitration clause in the MLA did
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not cover the particular dispute.224  Rather, the arbitration clause only covered
disputes concerning payments of license and support fees.225  Additionally, the
district court refused to stay proceedings pending VERSYSS’s and PCN’s
appeals under § 16 of the FAA.226
On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by stating
that “[t]o obtain a stay of a district court’s judgment, the appellant must
establish irreparable harm and a significant probability of success on the
merits, against a background norm that appellate courts are reluctant to disturb
decisions in advance of full review.”227  These two factors — irreparable harm
and significant probability of success on the merits — resemble the first two
factors enumerated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Braunskill228 and
applied in C.B.S. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Securities Corp.229  The Bradford-Scott Data Corp. court held that
based on this standard the appellants failed to meet their burden because costs
of litigation do not constitute irreparable harm.230  This conflicts with the
Western District of Tennessee’s holding in C.B.S., and with the beliefs of the
FAA drafters, that the cost of litigation is irreparable harm because it denies
the litigant the benefit of the bargain, i.e., not having to litigate a dispute.231
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis acknowledged that filing an appeal is not
sufficient to stay a lower court’s proceedings.232  Rather, a party may secure
a stay from the district court or from the appellate court, if the district court
denies the stay.233  Both district courts and appellate courts have applied the
four-prong test developed in Hilton, or some variant of it, to determine
whether to grant a stay.234  Because the Seventh Circuit’s previous analysis
dictated that the costs of litigation are not considered irreparable harm and a
stay should not be granted,235 the court changed the question from “whether
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appellants have shown a powerful reason why the district court must halt
proceedings” to “whether there is any good reason why the district court may
carry on once an appeal has been filed.”236
The Seventh Circuit may not have had to resort to these judicial gymnastics
in order to grant the stay.  In Graphic Communications Union v. Chicago
Tribune Co.,237 the Seventh Circuit held that no cost, including both out-of-
pocket and opportunity costs, associated with arbitration sufficiently qualifies
as irreparable harm in order to mandate that the appellate court grant a stay.238
The court reasoned that a contrary ruling would unduly facilitate the staying
of arbitration orders,239 thus losing the primary benefit of arbitration — the
swift resolution of disputes.240  This decision is also consistent with the
underlying policy of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements as well as the
U.S. Supreme Court’s policy of favoring arbitration.  The court reasoned that
the only harm to the party being compelled to arbitrate was having to contest
the dispute in a forum not of his choosing.241  As the court indicates, however,
this is no different than a denial of a summary judgment motion.242
The procedural posture of Graphic Communications Union, however, is
notably different than that found in Bradford-Scott Data Corp.  The most
important difference is that Graphic Communications Union involved a district
court decision compelling arbitration,243 while Bradford-Scott Data Corp.
involved a district court decision denying a motion to compel arbitration.244
As the district court in the Western District of Tennessee stated, a court’s
denial of a motion to stay the district court proceedings pending an appeal
from a denial to compel arbitration might pose irreparable harm because the
party seeking arbitration is being forced to litigate the dispute — the exact
reason for the appeal — and is being denied the benefit of the bargain.245
While the expense and delay of litigation eliminate the benefits of arbitration,
the parties still benefit at trial from the discovery and preparation done for
arbitration.246  Furthermore, the policy behind the FAA is to encourage, if not
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require, the courts to enforce contracts, specifically arbitration agreements.247
Moreover, the Supreme Court has shown its willingness to place arbitration
agreements above all other contracts.248  Considering both the procedural
posture of the appellant in Bradford-Scott Data Corp. and the policy of
enforcing contracts, even though a person seeking to avoid arbitration cannot
show irreparable harm, a person seeking to compel arbitration probably can.
In the end, the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-Scott Data Corp. implicitly
acknowledged the different results based on the posture of the individual
seeking the stay of the district court proceedings by changing the inquiry from
why the district court should be stayed to why the district should continue.249
In fact, the Seventh Circuit discussed how “[a]rbitration clauses reflect the
parties’ preference for non-judicial dispute resolution, which may be faster and
cheaper,” and how these benefits may be lost or reduced if the parties must
“proceed in both judicial and arbitral forums.”250  Accordingly, the court
concluded that “[c]ases of this kind are therefore poor candidates for
exceptions” to the general rule that notice of an appeal divests the district court
of jurisdiction.251
Even so, the Seventh Circuit’s primary argument for granting a stay pending
an appeal is that the arbitrability of the dispute is not inseparable from the
merits of the case.252 The court began its analysis in Bradford-Scott Data Corp.
by stating the general proposition that a district court and the court of appeals
should not exercise jurisdiction over the same case simultaneously.253  This
proposition, the court contended, was fundamental to a hierarchical
judiciary.254  Moreover, the issue of arbitrability is inseparable from the merits
of the case because continuation of the district court’s proceedings “largely
defeats” the purpose of the appeal and “creates a risk of inconsistent”
verdicts.255  Thus, arbitrability permeates the very essence of the dispute,
which is whether the district court has the authority to hear the dispute.256
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit analogized an appeal of arbitrability to
appeals asserting a double jeopardy defense, an Eleventh Amendment
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appeal in each scenario is whether the district court has the authority to hear
the case, the court stated that the district court’s proceedings are stayed unless
the district court or the court of appeals determines that the appeal is
frivolous.258  
Under this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit effectively created an automatic
stay of the district court’s proceedings when a litigant appeals a decision
adverse to arbitration.  The Seventh Circuit stated that the ability of the district
court or the court of appeals to determine whether the appeal is frivolous
sufficiently guards against an “obstinate or crafty litigant” disrupting the
district court’s proceedings.259  The court, however, failed to realize that these
two positions — quasi-automatic stay and the ability to determine whether the
appeal is frivolous — are at odds.  The Seventh Circuit’s assertion that
arbitrability is inseparable from the merits leaves no room for the district court
to exercise its discretion in determining that the appeal is frivolous.  Thus, a
stay is mandatory.260  Furthermore, short of determining the issue of
arbitrability, the court of appeals has no discretion to determine that an appeal
is frivolous and deny a stay.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit laid out the seminal opinion on why the
district court or the court of appeals should grant a stay of the district court’s
proceedings pending an appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration.
Effectively, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning rests on the proposition that
arbitrability is inseparable from the merits of the case because arbitrability
determines the extent of the district court’s jurisdiction.
2. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C.
In Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit analyzed the effect that an appeal under § 16 has on the
district court’s proceedings.261  The plaintiffs in Blinco alleged that the
defendant violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by
failing to notify the plaintiffs that the defendant was transferring the servicing
of the plaintiffs’ loan.262  The defendant contended that the arbitration
provision contained in the promissory note executed by the plaintiffs
controlled the issue and moved to stay the district court’s proceedings and
compel arbitration under the FAA.263  The arbitration provision stated that
“[a]ll disputes . . . arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships
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which result from this contract . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration.”264
Moreover, the contract provision also stated that the parties acknowledged
selecting arbitration rather than litigation.265  The district court denied both the
motion to compel arbitration and the motion to stay proceedings made by the
defendant.266  When the defendant appealed the denial under § 16(a)(1)(A), the
district court again denied the defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings
because the court did not want to set the precedent that interlocutory appeals
stayed proceedings,267 and “a stay was unnecessary because the issue of
arbitrability would be decided on appeal before trial.”268
To reach its decision, the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit in Bradford-Scott Data Corp. and held that “upon the filing
of a non-frivolous appeal under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a), the district court should not
exercise control over the aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”269
Moreover, “[u]pon motion, proceedings in the district court . . . should be
stayed pending resolution of a non-frivolous appeal from the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration.”270  The Eleventh Circuit was more explicit than
the Seventh Circuit, however, in stating that the cost of simultaneously
pursuing both litigation and arbitration mandates staying the district court’s
proceedings.  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Congress’s willingness to
provide immediate judicial review to parties seeking arbitration signified
Congress’s understanding that “one of the principal benefits of arbitration,
avoiding the high costs and time involved in judicial dispute resolution, is lost”
without granting a stay of the district court’s proceedings.271  In the court’s
view, allowing an immediate appeal without granting a stay of the lower
court’s proceedings is inconsistent with the policy behind an immediate
appeal.272  The court also stated that an arbitration provision gave a party the
right “not to litigate the dispute in court and bear the associated burdens,”
further indicating that the court should grant a stay.273  “If the court of appeals
reverses” a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, “the costs of . . . litigation
in the district court incurred during appellate review have been wasted and the
parties must begin again in arbitration.”274
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Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize the
inconsistency in its holding.  Even though the Eleventh Circuit stated that “a
stay need not be granted at the outset if the appeal is frivolous,”275 the court
failed to mention how to determine whether an appeal is frivolous without
making a ruling that is inconsistent with the policy rationales for granting an
immediate appeal.  The reasoning of the court leads to the conclusion that a
stay is mandatory because the court views the cost of litigation as irreparable
harm to the party wishing to arbitrate.  Such a conclusion leaves no room for
the district court to determine if the appeal is frivolous.  Furthermore, the court
of appeals can only determine that the appeal is frivolous by ruling on the
arbitrability of the dispute.  The court attempted to mitigate this result,
however, by providing a procedural overview if a stay is merely permissive
rather than mandatory,276 but this analysis is inapplicable because the stay is,
in fact, mandatory under the court’s rationale.
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit failed to directly address the district court’s
second reason for denying the stay: “that a stay was unnecessary because the
issue of arbitrability would be decided on appeal before trial.”277  Under the
Eleventh Circuit’s procedural guidelines, the district court can rule that a stay
is frivolous and proceed toward trial pending the appeal of the motion to
stay.278  At the very least, the denial of a motion to stay because the court of
appeals would hear the appeal on arbitrability before the district court’s trial
commenced implies that the stay is frivolous.  The Eleventh Circuit fails,
however, to show how the substance of this implicit ruling is inconsistent with
the Eleventh Circuit’s procedural guidelines that allow for a stay to be denied
in the case of a frivolous appeal.
Thus, under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, a stay is mandatory.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit provides inadequate guidelines for when
and how a court can determine whether an appeal is frivolous.
3. McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether an appeal under § 16 of the FAA stays the district court’s proceedings
in McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.279  The plaintiff and
defendant in McCauley had an agreement to arbitrate all claims that fell within
the defendant employer’s dispute resolution program.280  While working for
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005














the defendant, the plaintiff sustained injuries, and the defendant terminated the
plaintiff’s employment subsequent to the injury.281  The plaintiff filed suit
against the defendant, asserting claims of negligence, fraud and deceit,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination.282
Additionally, various members of the plaintiff’s family brought claims against
the defendant for loss of consortium.283
Upon the commencement of litigation, the defendant moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to the dispute resolution program.284  The district court
granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration for all claims except
those relating to negligence and loss of consortium.285  The court felt that these
claims were outside of the arbitration agreement.286  The defendant filed an
appeal in accordance with § 16 of the FAA to contest “the partial denial of its
motion to compel arbitration,” and the plaintiff moved for the district court to
stay its proceedings pending the appeal.287  The district court denied the
plaintiff’s motion to stay.288  Subsequently, the defendant moved to stay the
district court’s proceedings pending the appeal, but the district court denied
this motion to stay the proceedings as well and ordered the parties to proceed
to litigate the negligence and consortium claims.289  The defendant appealed
to the Tenth Circuit to stay all further litigation in the district court pending the
appeal on the arbitrability of the negligence and loss of consortium claims.290
On appeal, the defendant advanced two arguments in support of its
position.291  First, the defendant argued that notice of appeal automatically
divested the district court of jurisdiction.292  Second, the defendant asserted, in
the alternative, that the traditional four-factor test found in Hilton warranted
a stay.293  The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that even though the U.S. Supreme
Court had stated that “a federal district court and a federal court of appeals
should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously,” there was
no definitive guidance on whether the district court or court of appeals should
grant a motion to stay the district court’s proceedings during an interlocutory
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appeal under § 16 of the FAA.294  Noting this void, the court addressed the
current circuit split over this issue.295
The Tenth Circuit characterized the Second and Ninth Circuits as
“refus[ing] to stay proceedings in the district court while an arbitrability issue
is pending on appeal.”296  This assessment of the Second and Ninth Circuits’
holdings, however, is not entirely accurate.  More accurately, the Second and
Ninth Circuits have adopted a standard that grants discretion to the district
court and the court of appeals to determine whether a stay is warranted.297
Furthermore, both circuits have held that courts should grant a stay only in
exceptional circumstances because a stay may unnecessarily stall the district
court’s proceedings and because both circuits determined that arbitrability is
separate from the merits of the case.298  In fact, the Tenth Circuit later softened
its assessment by recognizing that the Ninth Circuit emphasized in its analysis
that the traditional stay analysis would allow for a case-by-case determination
of whether a stay of the district court’s proceedings is warranted.299
The Tenth Circuit characterized the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits as
holding that the district court or court of appeals should grant a stay of the
district court proceedings “so long as the appeal is not frivolous.”300  Again,
the opinions issued by Seventh and Eleventh Circuits do not fully support this
characterization.  These circuits have adopted a principle that effectively
mandates a stay of the district court proceedings upon a motion by one of the
litigants, thus making the frivolousness inquiry effectively irrelevant.301
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit addressed the merits of each of the positions
taken by other circuits.302
The Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that a nonfrivolous § 16 appeal
divests the district court of jurisdiction and requires the district court to grant
a stay.303  The Tenth Circuit based its conclusion on four main premises.  First,
like the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit compared an appeal under § 16 of
the FAA to an appeal from the denial of a qualified immunity claim because
both of these appeals concern whether the district court has the authority to
hear the case.304  The court noted that an appeal from the denial of a qualified
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immunity claim automatically divests the district court of jurisdiction “where
the court did not certify the appeal as frivolous or forfeited.”305  Second, and
more importantly, stays during interlocutory appeals are of great importance
because “[t]he interruption of the trial proceedings is the central reason and
justification for authorizing such an interlocutory appeal in the first place.
When an interlocutory appeal is taken, the district court only retains
jurisdiction to proceed with matters not involved in that appeal.”306  This
conclusion rests upon the belief that arbitrability and the merits of the case are
inseparable.  Third, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the district court should
grant a stay because the failure to stay the proceedings ignores “the parties’
preference for non-judicial dispute resolution, which may be faster and
cheaper.”307  Finally, failure to stay the proceedings “defeats the point of the
appeal and creates a risk of inconsistent handling of the case by two
tribunals.”308
The parties’ preference for a nonjudicial forum and the potential for
inconsistent handling by two tribunals potentially tips the balance of
frivolousness in favor of the party moving to compel arbitration, but this
imbalance is not necessarily at odds with the policy behind the FAA or the
U.S. Supreme Court’s policy of favoring arbitration.  First, Congress enacted
the FAA to encourage the enforcement of arbitration agreements.309  The high
standard set by the Tenth Circuit helps further this policy of encouraging
enforcement of arbitration agreements by limiting the flexibility a court may
exercise in determining whether an appeal is frivolous and a stay unwarranted.
Second, a determination of whether an appeal is frivolous must include the
possibility of reversal on the issue of frivolity by a reviewing court.310  Based
on the judicial preference for construing arbitration agreements generously,311
a reviewing court is likely to determine that appeals from a motion denying
arbitration are not frivolous.  Thus, the possibility of reversal is usually low.
Because of the low possibility of reversal and the last two rationales advanced
by the Tenth Circuit in McCauley, the district court would have to give great
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deference to a claim that an appeal would ultimately be determined not to be
frivolous.
In McCauley, the Tenth Circuit held that the inquiry into frivolousness
sufficiently protects against the use of interlocutory appeals for strategic
advantages, such as stalling the litigation.312  The Tenth Circuit concluded that
a district court should not declare an appeal frivolous until after the district
court has taken an “affirmative step” (e.g., a hearing) to inquire into
frivolousness, but once the district court has taken such an affirmative step, the
district court may proceed to trial unless the court of appeals intervenes.313
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis in McCauley adequately describes the role that
the district court plays in determining whether an appeal is frivolous.  The
Tenth Circuit asserted that the district court should perform the proper
balancing analysis, not implicitly as done in other cases addressing this
criterion, but explicitly through the use of an “affirmative step.”  In addition,
the court accurately assessed the unique place that interlocutory appeals hold
in the judicial process.
IV. Reconciling the Circuit Court Cases: A Solution for the Future
The proverbial bell cannot be unrung, and any analysis addressing
arbitration must include ample respect for Congress’s goals underlying the
FAA and for the current judiciary’s preference for enforcing arbitration
agreements.314  By enacting the FAA, Congress intended to encourage the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and to reverse the judiciary’s historical
hostility toward arbitration agreements.315  Congress also sought to promote
the use of an efficient business practice.316  In addition, based partly on the
policy goal of judicial economy, the courts have greatly expanded the reach of
the FAA.  Courts have accomplished this by generously construing arbitration
agreements to encompass a wide array of disputes and by interpreting
ambiguous issues in favor of arbitration.317  Thus, district courts and appellate
courts faced with the dilemma of whether to grant a stay of the district court’s
proceedings pending an appeal of the arbitrability of the dispute under § 16 of
the FAA should generally grant a stay unless compelling evidence suggests
that the appeal is predominately motivated by an interest to stall the litigation
or that the appellant is extremely unlikely to succeed.  Moreover, a stay should
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only be denied after the district court has taken an affirmative step to address
the success of the pending appeal.  Enforcing arbitration agreements except in
extreme circumstances promotes the efficient allocation of the parties’
resources, furthers the policy of judicial economy, and protects the interests of
all parties involved.
Interestingly, this standard of presumptively granting a stay unless there is
a compelling justification to the contrary is likely the standard being enforced
at the circuit level, even though it is not so explicitly stated.  Regarding the
circuits that have denied a stay of the district court proceedings, facts and
circumstances in those cases suggested that the appellant was more interested
in stalling the litigation than enforcing the arbitration agreement.318  On the
other hand, the circuits that have granted a stay had no extenuating
circumstances that suggested anything other than that the parties truly wanted
to enforce the arbitration agreements.319
For example, in Britton, the Ninth Circuit denied a motion to stay the
district court’s proceedings.320  The defendant in Britton moved to compel
arbitration only after it became apparent that his Fifth Amendment defense
would not succeed and that the plaintiffs were not interested in a settlement.321
When viewed in this light, applying the factors and analysis articulated in
C.B.S. would most likely result in a refusal to grant a stay.322  First, the
defendant would have a difficult time showing irreparable harm if the stay was
not granted because he was using arbitration primarily as a means to avoid
litigation.  Moreover, the defendant did not seek relief from the prospective
harm of litigation until after it was apparent that litigation would likely be
unsuccessful.  Therefore, by denying the stay, the court would not be seen as
denying the party the benefit of the bargain because the defendant was merely
delaying his “awful day” in court.323  Second, the plaintiffs would face
additional delays in finally resolving their claims.  Thus, the plaintiffs could
likely show an injury substantial enough to mandate that a stay should not be
granted.  Third, one of the motivating factors for the passage of the FAA was
the quick resolution of disputes.324  Granting a stay in Britton would
unnecessarily frustrate this goal because the litigation was already over a year
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old.325  Finally, the facts of Britton are inconclusive on whether there was a
significant legal dispute, but the other factors outweigh all but the most
definite claims.  Overall, by not granting a stay in Britton, albeit for incorrect
legal reasons, the court achieved the proper outcome by not allowing
arbitration to be used primarily as a means to frustrate a party’s ability to
enforce his rights under an arbitration agreement and achieve justice.
Even though the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Britton is justifiable, the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning must still be the exception, not the rule.  First, The Ninth
Circuit has shown an unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements.326  This
type of hostility partially motivated Congress to pass the FAA.327  Thus, to
allow courts the freedom to deny stays in all circumstances would frustrate not
only the original intent of the FAA but also the current judiciary’s policy of
broadly interpreting and enforcing arbitration agreements.  Moreover,
decisions such as Britton lack an affirmative step before the court denies the
stay, and without this step the reviewing court has no record on which to base
its review.  Furthermore, unless there is an affirmative step, there is no
assurance that the parties’ interests were adequately represented or protected.
The Second Circuit decisions in In re Salomon and Motorola also fit within
this exception for denying a stay of the district court’s proceedings.  First, in
In re Salomon, the parties had been litigating their dispute for three years
before the employees moved to compel arbitration, and the court found that the
employees made the motion only to prevent the litigation from proceeding.328
Under these facts, the rationales of speedy resolution of disputes and
protecting the party desiring arbitration from incurring unnecessary expenses
are not at their strongest.  The FAA does not require the court to enforce a
party’s rights or protect a party’s interests if that party is not willing to do the
same.  Thus, the court was correct in denying a stay based on the most likely
intentions behind the motion to compel arbitration.  Second, in Motorola, the
defendants had “swindled” two corporations out of more than two billion
dollars, made false accusations about the plaintiffs, and had only moved for
arbitration after their litigation efforts were unsuccessful.329  Again, these
defendants were not using arbitration to avoid the delays and costs of litigation
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or in pursuit of arbitration’s ability to afford nontraditional remedies.  In fact,
as the trial was complete, the defendants had already incurred all of the costs
of litigation.330  Instead, the defendants attempted to use arbitration as a final
effort to postpone a negative outcome and frustrate the plaintiffs’ ability to
find justice.
This is not to say, however, that the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
were completely correct in their assessment of the issue.  None of these
circuits created adequate safeguards to protect against a crafty litigant
motivated, not by a genuine concern to compel arbitration, but by an interest
in stalling the litigation.  In fact, all of these circuits adopted what amounts to
a policy of an automatic stay.331  The definitions of frivolousness, or lack
thereof, provided by these circuits do not allow for the courts to expand the
inquiry from the merits of the appeal to the party’s motives for bringing the
appeal, the timing of the appeal, or the role the court should play in protecting
the litigants.332  Even so, the outcomes of these circuits’ decisions probably
would not have changed even if the circuits had applied this more exacting
standard because, from the record, none of the parties seeking stays appeared
to be motivated by anything other than a desire to enforce the original
agreement.333
The Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits also failed to fully develop the
concept that the procedural posture of the party bringing the appeal should
play a significant role in determining whether the court should grant a stay.
The Seventh Circuit mentioned how failing to stay the district court’s
proceedings could effectively deny the party wishing to arbitrate the benefit
of the bargain, but the court did not rely on this procedural posture rationale
in reaching its conclusion.334  This, however, is one of the strongest rationales
in support of granting a stay.  First, Congress specifically enacted the FAA to
ensure that parties wishing to arbitrate would not have to bear the delays and
costs of litigation.335  Second, although a party being forced to litigate might
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not recover its costs if arbitration is later determined to be appropriate, a party
forced to arbitrate can most likely apply all costs associated with arbitration to
litigation if litigation is later deemed appropriate.336  Finally, § 16 of the FAA
accentuates this discrepancy by allowing for an immediate interlocutory appeal
from decisions that are anti-arbitration and denying interlocutory appeals from
decisions that are pro-arbitration.337  
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit did make great progress toward a
mechanism allowing for the proper application of a standard of presumptively
granting a stay of the district court’s proceedings unless there is a compelling
counterjustification while protecting the rights of all parties to a dispute.  First,
the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the unique and important role of interlocutory
appeals in the judicial process, and recognized the significance of Congress’s
authorization of an interlocutory appeal from a decision adverse to
arbitration.338  Moreover, Congress enacted § 16 as a means to advance the
conservation of judicial resources and allow parties quicker access to justice.339
Both of these facts bear heavily on what default rule the courts should follow
because courts should act in a way consistent with these motives.  Second, the
Tenth Circuit recognized that an arbitration provision is simply another valid
forum selection clause that courts should respect.340  Finally, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that in the interest of protecting the rights of all parties involved
in a dispute, the courts must take an affirmative step before denying a motion
to stay the district court’s proceedings.341  The requirement of an affirmative
step is arguably the Tenth Circuit’s most important contribution to this debate.
Requiring an affirmative step advances the goal of reversing judicial hostility
toward arbitration by forcing courts to justify decisions adverse to arbitration.
Theoretically, if a hearing is required before a court can deny a motion to stay
the district court’s proceedings, courts could deny a stay only when the fact
pattern is skewed significantly in favor of such action.
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While no circuit has provided an adequate standard to determine if the
district court’s proceedings should be stayed pending an appeal from a denial
of a motion to compel arbitration, the circuits have implicitly applied a
workable standard.  Even though there is an apparent circuit split, the circuits’
differences can be easily reconciled when the different terminology is
dissected.  Finally, the Tenth Circuit came the closest to framing the proper
inquiry in McCauley, but even that opinion falls short of the standard
advocated for in this comment.
V. Conclusion
Courts should presumptively grant a stay pending an appeal under § 16 of
the FAA.  The objectives of the original drafters of the FAA and the drafters
of § 16 of the FAA — encouraging the enforcement of an efficient business
practice — support this conclusion because such an appeal is from a decision
opposed to arbitration.  Moreover, the current judicial policy favoring
arbitration articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court also supports such an
outcome.
Even so, stays should be discretionary rather than mandatory.  As evidenced
by the examples cited above, some situations call for the denial of a motion to
stay in order to advance justice.  Additionally, promoting arbitration must be
balanced against the fact that once a final award occurs in arbitration, courts
are generally unwilling to reverse the arbitrator’s decision.  By allowing courts
some discretion, the rights of the party not wishing to arbitrate are protected.342
Further, courts should read § 16 of the FAA as allowing a discretionary stay,
rather than a mandatory stay, because § 3 of the FAA explicitly gives the
district court authority to make arbitration decisions,343 and § 16 should be
interpreted in a way consistent with § 3.344  Finally, a discretionary stay
respects the drafter’s intentions of placing arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other contracts.345  A mandatory stay, on the other hand, would
require courts to enforce arbitration agreements with a deference not given to
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The standard proposed by this comment strikes the appropriate balance
between enforcing arbitration provisions and protecting the interest of all
parties, especially those not wishing to arbitrate.  Just as the drafters of the
FAA believed, arbitration has proven to be a “low-cost,” fast alternative to
litigation,347 and under this comment’s standard, the party wishing to compel
arbitration has the opportunity to receive this benefit.348  Additionally,
enforcing arbitration agreements as a form of a valid forum selection clause
allows individuals in the marketplace to better predict their potential costs and
plan accordingly.349  Additionally, a ruling to proceed to arbitration that is later
reversed has fewer negative ramifications than a reversal of an order to
proceed to trial because the cost and time devoted to arbitration can usually be
applied to the litigation but the cost and time devoted to litigation greatly
exceed that which is necessary for arbitration alone.350  Finally, because the
stay is discretionary, a party not wishing to arbitrate is given protection against
being bound by an unauthorized arbitration award.  Thus, the parties face
fewer hardships and judicial resources are conserved when the court errs in
favor of arbitration as opposed to favoring litigation.
Most importantly, the interests of all parties are best protected by requiring
the district court to take an affirmative step.  First, an affirmative step guards
against hasty action.  Second, it requires courts to justify their decisions
against arbitration and thus, advances the goal of reversing judicial hostility
against arbitration.  Third, an affirmative step encourages judicial inquiry into
the motivations of the party moving to compel arbitration.  These motivations
may be gleaned from factors such as the timing of the motion or the extent of
litigation completed before the motion.  An affirmative step also provides the
parties an opportunity to justify their positions.  Most importantly, an
affirmative step permits the party not wishing to arbitrate an opportunity to
voice his or her concerns that he or she will be bound by an arbitration award
from an erroneously ordered arbitration.  
An affirmative step does not, however, require the reviewing court to re-
determine the arbitrability of the dispute.  The reviewing court need only
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address the likelihood that the appeal from the denial to compel arbitration will
be successful and the parties motivations for bringing the appeal.  The
reviewing court should consider such things as the procedural posture of the
party, the policy behind the FAA of enforcing contracts, and the U.S.
judiciary’s policy of “rigorously enforcing” arbitration agreements.  As
discussed, a party wishing to compel arbitration probably can satisfy the
traditional test, developed in Hilton, for determining if a court should grant a
stay, while a party trying to avoid arbitration probably cannot.
Overall, a stay should be presumptively granted pending an appeal of a
decision adverse to arbitration, but facts and circumstances that show that
arbitration is only being used as a means to stall the litigation can rebut this
presumption.  Additionally, courts should not feel that they are required to
grant a stay because justice may require the opposite result.  In any scenario,
courts should deny a motion to stay and proceed to trial only after the court has
taken an affirmative step, such as a hearing, to inquire into the issue.  This is
most likely the standard that is currently being applied by the circuits.  This
comment asserts that the circuits should formally and explicitly adopt this
standard in light of the FAA’s history and the judiciary’s current deference
toward arbitration agreements.
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